| Nama Pengarang | : | Purnomo, Aloys Budi |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | Inspirasi |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | XIX (No. 225) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 37-44 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | - |
| Nama Pengarang | : | Bavo Samosir |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | Inspirasi |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | XIX (No. 225) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 28-36 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | - |
| Nama Pengarang | : | Julius Kardinal Darmaatmaja |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | Inspirasi |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | XIX (No. 225) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 12-27 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | - |
| Nama Pengarang | : | Purnomo, Aloys Budi |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | Inspirasi |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | XIX (No. 225) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 4-11 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | - |
| Nama Pengarang | : | Pande Radja Silalahi |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | Analisis CSIS |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | XXIX-1 (No. 1) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 26-35 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | - |
| Nama Pengarang | : | García-Feijoo, Luis,Jensen, Tyler K.,Koch, Paul D. |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Accounting Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 99 (No. 3) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 169–199 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | We document time-varying interrelations between aggregate funding conditions and the impact of operating leverage (OL) on stock returns. OL represents a primitive source of risk, which helps explain the well established unconditional relation between OL and future returns. However, the outperformance of firms with high OL occurs exclusively during periods of unconstrained funding. Although high OL represents operational inflexibility, when the Fed eases funding constraints, improved capital availability mitigates this inflexibility. Consequently, investors bid up the prices of stocks with high OL when aggregate funding constraints are loosened to reflect their lower risk and greater expected performance in unconstrained periods |
| Nama Pengarang | : | Ferguson, Andrew,Cecilia Wei Hu,Lam, Peter |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Accounting Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 99 (No. 3) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 141–167 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | This study investigates the economic consequences of the IFRS 3 (2008) requirement for fair valuing earnouts. Using a hand-collected sample of earnout fair value estimates in acquisitions completed by Australian firms, we find that a significant portion of acquirers overstate initial earnout liabilities and strategically reverse them as operating gains to boost post-M&A earnings. These overstatements are more pronounced when acquirers face investment- and performance-related pressure but attenuated in the presence of high-quality auditors and debt-financed deals. Acquirers also obfuscate earnout-related disclosures, inhibiting investors` assessment of earnout values. By doing so, managers extend their tenure. Further analysis reveals that IFRS 3 (2008) leads to a significant increase in both the frequency and magnitude of earnouts in public acquirers` transactions. Overall, we highlight the accounting benefit of earnouts for acquirers under IFRS 3 (2008), with implications for investors, analysts, auditors, and standard setters |
| Nama Pengarang | : | Easton, Peter D. ...[et al.] |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Accounting Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 99 (No. 3) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 115–140 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | We use a simple k-nearest neighbors algorithm (hereafter, k-NN) to forecast earnings. k-NN forecasts of one-, two-, and three-year-ahead earnings are more accurate than those generated by popular extant forecasting approaches. k-NN forecasts of two- and three-year (one-year)-ahead EPS and aggregate three-year EPS are more (less) accurate than those generated by analysts. The association between the unexpected earnings implied by k-NN and the contemporaneous market-adjusted return (i.e., the earnings association coefficient (EAC)) is positive and exceeds the EAC on unexpected earnings implied by alternate approaches. A trading strategy that is long (short) firms for which k-NN predicts positive (negative) earnings growth earns positive risk-adjusted returns that exceed those earned by similar trading strategies that are based on alternate forecasts. The k-NN algorithm generates an empirically reliable ex ante indicator of forecast accuracy that identifies situations when the k-NN EAC is larger and the k-NN trading strategy is more profitable |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Accounting Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 99 (No. 3) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 87–113 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | Prior research suggests that (1) politically active firms have an information advantage over firms that do not engage in the political process but also that (2) politically active firms are more likely to disclose policy-related information. We examine whether there are externalities associated with the processing of political information by politically active firms. We study this question in the setting of intraindustry information transfers around earnings announcements. Measuring firms` political activism using campaign contributions, we find stronger intraindustry information transfers from politically active firms to their industry peers. These information transfers are stronger when there is more discussion during conference calls of political topics that have industry- or market-wide implications. Similarly, these information transfers are also stronger when there is greater political uncertainty. Our paper highlights an important information externality related to politically active firms` disclosures and improves our understanding of how politically active firms affect their industries` information environment |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Accounting Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 99 (No. 3) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 59–86 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | This study examines whether politicians exhibit hometown favoritism in assigning preferential corporate income tax rates. We find that firms with hometown connections to incumbent provincial leaders experience favorable tax treatment. This effect is more pronounced when those leaders have strong hometown preferences and weaker when they have a strong incentive to seek promotion, suggesting that social incentives are the primary drivers of the effects on corporate tax benefits of hometown favoritism by politicians. Moreover, this effect is intensified when members of senior management have personal connections with the provincial leader. The mechanism test reveals that the provincial governments tend to qualify connected firms for preferential tax policies under their jurisdictions. Overall, our results suggest that hometown favoritism by politicians promotes tax benefits for business entities |