| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Accounting Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 99 (No. 3) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 37–57 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | We study the properties of long-term bonus pools (BPs) with rollover provision in a multiperiod moral hazard setting, where the principal uses subjective information to privately assess the agent`s performance and the agent is protected by limited liability (LL). To provide incentives, the principal funds a multiperiod BP with a fixed payment that may be distributed over time to the agent and a third party. We find that the optimal long-term BP contract features performance targets that are contingent on past performance. Specifically, high subjective performance implies an easy target, and low subjective performance implies a difficult target. To implement the longterm BP contract, the principal provides nondichotomous performance reports. The study contributes to the literature that discusses the mechanisms that make subjective performance information useful for incentive contracting |
| Nama Pengarang | : | Godsell, David,Clara Xiaoling Chen,Baik, Dave (Young-Il) |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Accounting Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 99 (No. 3) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 1–36 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | We investigate the effect of board gender diversity (BGD) on investment outcomes. We identify variation in BGD by compiling, for the first time, a global catalog of 83 BGD interventions implemented in 59 countries between 1999 and 2021. Using a staggered difference-in-differences research design, we document that BGD interventions improve investment outcomes. We find that treated firms reduce inefficient investment by 0.6 percent of total assets or 6.5 percent of total investment and are 4 percentage points more likely to have above-median investment efficiency. Cross-sectional tests reveal more pronounced results when BGD interventions are mandatory, are strongly enforced, and result in larger BGD increases. Event-time, stacked panel, and a wide variety of endogeneity-mitigating robustness tests corroborate. Our plausibly causal inferences have important implications for both research and practice |
| Nama Pengarang | : | Dwiastuti, Rini |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Accounting Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 99 (No. 2) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 457–481 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | We study the role of reporting systems in the context of bank runs. In our model, a bank receives an early but imprecise estimate of its investment performance, and its financial reporting system generates a report. We find that, from a financial-stability standpoint, the optimal reporting system requires full disclosure when the bank`s early estimate is below a certain threshold, but no disclosure otherwise. Importantly, such optimal reporting threshold should be tailored to the bank`s exposure to bank-run risk. In particular, the threshold is nonmonotonic and U-shaped in the bank-run risk. We also relate our results to current accounting standards and discuss their implications for policy-making and empirical research |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Accounting Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 99 (No. 2) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 421–456 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | This study examines whether crowdsourced forecasts of earnings and revenues help investors unravel bias in earnings announcement news, which is commonly derived from analyst forecasts. Our results suggest that investors, on average, understand and price the predictive signals reflected in crowdsourced forecasts about the bias in analyst-based earnings and revenue surprises. Using the staggered addition of firms to the Estimize platform, we find that crowdsourced coverage is associated with reductions in the mispricing of forecast bias and declines in earnings announcement premia. We further find some evidence that managers use income-increasing accruals to meet the crowdsourced forecast benchmark and that they respond to crowdsourced coverage through increased downward earnings and revenue guidance. Overall, we conclude that user-generated content on crowdsourced financial information platforms helps investors discount biases in traditional equity research and thereby better process the news in earnings announcements |
| Nama Pengarang | : | Khan, S,Tamer, E |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Accounting Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 99 (No. 2) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 395–419 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | We examine how disclosure and manager reputation influence capital raised when there is no commercial substance underlying the investment. Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs or ``blank check`` companies) do not have operations or substantive assets at the IPO but promise to use the funds raised to acquire a private firm, generally within two years. Given the lack of commercial substance and historically poor ex post performance, it is unclear what SPACs disclose at the IPO and why investors invest. Although disclosure is important in traditional IPOs, the underlying information available differs for SPACs. Nonetheless, our evidence suggests disclosures are useful to SPAC investors, although differently than for traditional IPO investors. We also examine manager reputation and find prior SPAC or CEO experience and celebrity status are associated with funds raised. Even when an investment lacks commercial substance, disclosure and reputation are important for investing decisions |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Accounting Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 99 (No. 2) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 369–393 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | There are instances where CEO turnover occurs, even if the company has not made any significant strategy changes, and the new CEO possesses similar abilities as the predecessor. This paper aims to provide a rational explanation for this seemingly irrational phenomenon. One possible reason for this ``aggressive`` CEO turnover is the board`s desire to reduce the information rents earned by the privately informed CEO. Specifically, the incumbent CEO has a temptation to ``sandbag`` the board about profitability prospects to secure more generous incentive pay for future implementation, and a (seemingly aggressive) replacement policy helps discourage this kind of gaming. That is, instead of ``information-based entrenchment`` as suggested by the literature (Laux 2008; Inderst and Mueller 2010), this paper shows a countervailing effect that the CEO`s private information (combined with the later-stage moral hazard problem) may lead to her dismissal more often than the ex post efficient benchmark |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Accounting Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 99 (No. 2) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 341–367 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | The wide-spread reporting of non-GAAP earnings suggests efficiency gains from doing so. By estimating a dynamic investment model, we examine the real implications of investors using both GAAP and nonGAAP earnings to value firms. When investors use the firm`s GAAP earnings only, the firm`s manager—who cares about current stock prices—underinvests, and his investment is sensitive to transitory earnings. Non-GAAP earnings can improve investment efficiency by adjusting for these transitory earnings, but can also hide inefficient investment by introducing opportunistic bias. Although non-GAAP earnings induce overinvestment, they dominate GAAP-only reporting. Counterfactual analysis reveals supplementing GAAP earnings with biased non-GAAP earnings increases firm value by 3.4 percent relative to GAAP-only reporting. Precluding bias reduces overinvestment and further increases firm value by 1 percent |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Accounting Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 99 (No. 2) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 307–339 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | Tax aggressiveness presents nontax risks to firms` cash flow. Evaluating these risks requires information beyond the accounting function`s expertise, resulting in high processing costs to acquire and integrate risk information relevant to tax strategies. Managers can rationally adapt by making assumptions about risk information, potentially resulting in decision biases when evaluating the risk-reward tradeoff of tax aggressiveness. Using a novel regulatory setting in the U.S. insurance industry, I examine whether the adoption of mandated enterprise risk assessments updates managers` prior beliefs about the nontax risks of tax aggressiveness. I find that as regulation requires managers to accept processing costs to acquire and integrate risk information, managers learn about previously underestimated nontax risks and significantly reduce tax aggressiveness. Results suggest that absent firm-wide internal risk information, managers can use aggressive tax positions without fully considering nontax risks |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Accounting Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 99 (No. 2) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 279–305 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | Although it is well understood that product market competition acts as a disciplining mechanism that reduces inefficiencies, our understanding of the implications for firms` incentive design choices is still limited. We use a comprehensive new measure of competition and examine its effect on four major choices: CEO equity portfolio incentives, annual bonus plan incentives, choice of performance measures, and difficulty of financial performance targets. We find that competition reduces firm profits and total CEO compensation, including equity grants, which then also weakens portfolio incentives. Firms respond by adjusting annual bonus plans to restore incentives. Specifically, we find that competition goes together with stronger bonus plan incentives, more challenging annual performance targets, and a greater emphasis on long-term performance measures. Finally, we show that competition increases performance relative to annual bonus targets, which we interpret as evidence that CEOs work harder but get paid less in highly competitive environments |
| Nama Pengarang | : | Kleppe, Tyler J. ...[et al.] |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Accounting Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 99 (No. 2) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 249–277 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | Although daylight saving time (DST) is thought to provide economic benefits, extant research documents various adverse effects of DST adjustments. However, prior research provides little conclusive evidence about the effects of DST adjustments on capital market participants. We examine the effects of ``spring forward`` DST advances, which disrupt the human sleep cycle and economic activities, on investors` processing of earnings news. We find a delayed price response to earnings news released during the first week following a DST advance. We also find that this effect is stronger among firms with investors who are more likely to be trading on earnings news and among firms with less sophisticated investors. Our findings contribute to research on the unintended consequences of DST adjustments and to the growing literature on intra-investor variation in disclosure processing costs. Our study may be of interest to legislators currently debating proposed legislation that would eliminate DST phasing |