| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Accounting Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 99 (No. 2) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 229–248 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | Toward the goal of reconciling conflicting arguments on whether performance-based incentives facilitate or impede divergent thinking, we identify a feature common to prior demonstrations of negative incentive effects: they generally involve tasks with only one correct solution. Our first experiment replicates a negative incentive effect when insight problems require ``bottom-up`` divergent thinking from an unexpected resource to the problem it is uniquely equipped to solve, whereas our second experiment finds a positive incentive effect in the more general case of problems that enable ``top-down`` divergent thinking from a problem to multiple potential solutions. We also observe a positive incentive effect in a third experiment that measures the time needed to generate a solution to problems that have multiple potential solutions and in a fourth experiment in which participants design insight problems. Overall, our findings suggest that any harmful effects of performance-based incentives are likely restricted to highly constrained settings |
| Nama Pengarang | : | Jiapeng He...[et al.] |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Accounting Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 99 (No. 2) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 195–227 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | We argue that contracting with the federal government involves significant proprietary information cost due to regulations requiring contractors to provide proprietary information, which may become available to outsiders via Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. We provide evidence by showing that firms become more willing to bid for government contracts after a recent Supreme Court ruling on FOIA (Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media) that improved information protection for contractors and that this effect strengthens when the contracts entail higher proprietary information cost for contractors |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Accounting Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 99 (No. 2) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 169–194 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | We examine the effects of mandating compensation disclosure on executive incentive contracts, earnings management, firm value, and social welfare. We develop a moral hazard model with multiple principal-agent pairs facing an external monitor who allocates resources across firms to verify earnings management. With such scrutiny allocation, contracts exhibit externalities that create a coordination problem among principals. Contract disclosure enables principals to design the contract anticipating the monitor`s reaction. However, it may also exacerbate the coordination problem among principals because they do not consider externalities on other principals caused by the effects of their contract choices on the monitor`s scrutiny allocation. If internal controls are relatively weak, contract disclosure may make contracts more strongly contingent on reported earnings, increase earnings manipulation, and nevertheless increase social welfare. Contract disclosure improves firm value only if the scrutiny resources available to the monitor are not strongly constrained |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Accounting Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 99 (No. 2) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 143–168 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | How prior trust moderates investor responses to restatements is unknown. We examine how societal trust affects the changes in institutional investors` shareholdings around a restatement. We consider two competing hypotheses based on the erosion of trust and confirmatory bias. We find the change in institutional investors` shareholdings around a restatement is more negative for investors from high trust areas compared to low trust areas, consistent with an erosion of trust where high trust institutional investors view the restatement as a violation of trust. Further analyses show that our findings vary with the regulatory or economic environment, type of institution, and type of restatement. Our results are also robust to different tests that address endogeneity and use alternative societal trust measures. Overall, we contribute to the literature by examining the role of societal trust in a dynamic setting where investors` trust-based beliefs about the credibility of accounting information are not realized |
| Nama Pengarang | : | Johnson, Ryan G.,Campbell, John L.,Cadman, Brian D. |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Accounting Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 99 (No. 2) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 113–141 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | Boards of directors encourage risk-averse managers to take risky actions by providing stock options and severance pay. We demonstrate that the ability of these incentives to encourage risk-taking hinges on the level of uncertainty facing the manager. We confirm prior findings that stock option convexity encourages risk-taking but find that this relation only holds when market-wide uncertainty is low. We also confirm prior findings that severance pay encourages risk-taking but find that this relation only holds during high market-wide uncertainty and negative marketwide performance. Finally, we find that compensation committees respond to variation in uncertainty by adjusting the level of option grants. Our results suggest that the effectiveness of incentives to take risk varies with the market-wide uncertainty, and that boards consider this in annual compensation design |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Accounting Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 99 (No. 2) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 85–112 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | This study documents that M&A delistings are associated with a deterioration in the quality of analysts` information environment for industry peer firms, measured by an increase in analysts` absolute forecast errors and dispersion. This effect persists for six quarters and is larger when the delisting target firm contributes relatively more to the industry information environment. Further, we find that, among analysts forecasting earnings for an industry peer firm, those who also followed the delisted target firm in the pre-M&A period experience a larger increase in their absolute forecast errors. A comparison based on public versus private target firms also suggests that the loss of target firms` public disclosures plays a role in the deterioration in the quality of analysts` information environment. In additional analyses, we find evidence consistent with this effect resulting from a deterioration in analysts` ability to exploit across-firm information complementarities |
| Nama Pengarang | : | Bradshaw, Mark T. ,Lee, Lian Fen,Peterson, Kyle |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Accounting Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 99 (No. 2) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 57–84 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | We examine firm decisions to provide listings of sell-side analyst coverage on corporate investor relations (IR) websites. These listings are related to three major areas of financial research—voluntary disclosure, investor relations, and analysts. Our hand-collected data permit cross-sectional and time-series analyses. Firms are more likely to have such listings when analysts are more important information intermediaries and when firms are directly involved in managing their IR websites. For firms with listings, the probability of an analyst being included on the listing is increasing in firm awareness of and familiarity with the analyst, how active and favorable the analyst is, and the analyst`s reputation. Additional analysis indicates similar results across self-hosting versus third-party hosting IR websites, with a notable exception that self-hosting firms exhibit a stronger preference for analysts who issue more favorable research about the firm. Decisions to add or drop analysts from listings reinforce the main results |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Accounting Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 99 (No. 2) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 31–56 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | The negative effects of common ownership on competition have received significant attention, but many proposed mechanisms for institutional investor influence seem implausible. We develop and test an analytical model of optimal compensation in an oligopoly with common ownership, focusing on revenue-based pay as a plausible channel through which institutional investors might influence competition. Our model implies a negative effect of common ownership on firms` use of revenue-based pay. Using both associative analyses and an event study difference-in-differences design based on plausibly exogenous institutional mergers, we find no evidence of a negative relation between common ownership and the use of revenue-based pay, except in an economically small subsample of extremely concentrated owners. Results involving relative performance incentives are similar. Collectively, our results provide no support for the notion that cross-owning blockholders in general influence compensation contracts in order to soften executives` incentives to compete aggressively |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Accounting Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 99 (No. 2) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 1–29 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | As audits of public companies are labor intensive, require a variety of team members, and involve yearround work, practitioners and academics have increasingly focused on identifying audit production factors that drive audit quality. Using proprietary data, we analyze the cost-benefit tradeoffs of two audit production characteristics, client expertise and the relative amount of auditing done during the early phases of the audit, and find that both are associated with more effective audits and higher fees. We analyze whether the influence of these characteristics varies across audit team members. We find that middle manager production characteristics explain audit effectiveness and higher fees and relatively more so than those of lead/review partners. These results extend the literature and practitioner discussions about drivers of audit quality by highlighting the importance of middle management, which, to our knowledge, has largely been overlooked by the archival audit literature and regulatory guidance on audit quality indicators. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | Zhang, Vincent (Qiru) |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Accounting Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 99 (No. 1) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 427–453 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | In 2010, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board proposed a rule change requiring the display of current credit ratings on the EMMA website, a centralized repository of municipal bond information. Before the rule change, current credit ratings were freely available on individual rating agencies` websites or on EMMA if municipalities provided relevant continuing disclosures, making it unclear whether the rule change would benefit investors. A difference-in-differences analysis reveals the rule change is associated with a 6–8 basis-point decrease in investor transaction costs. This effect is concentrated among the intended beneficiaries (retail investors) when credit risk information demand is high (long-maturity bonds) and current credit rating information on EMMA is low (no continuing disclosure of rating changes was provided on EMMA). The rule change appears to have helped retail investors become aware of current credit ratings by filling a disclosure gap on EMMA for municipalities without continuing disclosures of rating changes |