| Nama Pengarang | : | |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | Jurnal Reformasi Ekonomi |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 1 (No. 1) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 77-78 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | - |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | Jurnal Reformasi Ekonomi |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 1 (No. 1) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 70-76 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | - |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | Jurnal Reformasi Ekonomi |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 1 (No. 1) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 64-69 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | - |
| Nama Pengarang | : | Douglas F. Prawitt,Brian C. Spilker |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | Behavioral Research in Accounting |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 9 (No. 1) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 172-198 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | Time pressure is an important feature of many accounting settings. This study describes a theoretical basis and provides supporting empirical evidence re- garding how experience influences adaptation to time pressure in a tax infor- mation search task. Forty-three tax professionals and 53 graduate tax slu- dents participated in a computerized experiment in which subjects selected relevant key words relating to a partnership tax issue. Results are consistent with the idea that, in response to time pressure, experienced decision mak- ers are able to selectively identity and encode information important in the context of an information search task to a greater extent than inexperienced decision makers. This increased selectivity allowed experienced subjects to respond to time pressure by (1) reducing the amount of time they spent ini- tially assimilating the problem statement to a greater extent than inexperi- enced subjects, (2) decreasing the amount of time they spent referring back to the factual case information to a greater extent than did inexperienced subjects, and (3) increasing the degree to which they searched more impor- tant areas of the database per unit of search time to a greater extent than did inexperienced subjects. These findings provide new insights on how time pressure and experience interactively affect the way decision makers selec- tively encode and use information during information searches. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Accounting Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 92 (No. 6) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 25-47 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | This study examines the effect of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act) on information uncertainty in IPO firms. The JOBS Act creates a new category of issuer, the Emerging Growth Company (EGC), and exempts EGCs from several disclosures required for non-EGCs. Our findings are consistent with proprietary cost concerns motivating EGCs to eliminate some of the previously mandatory disclosures, which increases information uncertainty in the IPO market, attracts investors who rely more on private information, and leads EGCs to provide additional post-IPO disclosures to mitigate the increased information uncertainty. Our results also are consistent with agency explanations, whereby EGCs exploit the JOBS Act provisions to avoid compensation-related disclosures, which results in larger IPO underpricing for such firms. Overall, we provide evidence on how reduced mandatory disclosure affects the IPO market. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | Jurnal Reformasi Ekonomi |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 1 (No. 1) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 56-63 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | - |
| Nama Pengarang | : | Gert Cauwenberghs |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Accounting Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 92 (No. 6) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 1-23 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | We demonstrate a novel link between relationship-specific investments and risk in a setting where division managers operate under moral hazard and collaborate on joint projects. Specific investments increase efficiency at the margin. This expands the scale of operations and thereby adds to the compensation risk borne by the managers. Accounting for this investment/risk link overturns key findings from prior incomplete contracting studies. We find that if the investing manager has full bargaining power vis-a`-vis the other manager, he will underinvest relative to the benchmark of contractible investments; with equal bargaining power, however, he may overinvest. The reason is that the investing manager internalizes only his own share of the investment-induced risk premium (we label this a ‘‘risk transfer’’), whereas the principal internalizes both managers’ incremental risk premia. We show that high pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) reduces the managers’ incentives to invest in relationshipspecific assets. The optimal PPS, thus, trades off investment and effort incentives. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | Pidluska, Inna |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | Jurnal Reformasi Ekonomi |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 1 (No. 1) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 49-55 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | - |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | Jurnal Reformasi Ekonomi |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 1 (No. 1) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 43-48 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | Deskripsi abstrak ringkas tidak tersedia untuk artikel ini. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | Jurnal Reformasi Ekonomi |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 1 (No. 1) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 35-42 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | Deskripsi abstrak ringkas tidak tersedia untuk artikel ini. |