| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Accounting Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 98 (No. 3) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 397-425 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | Using two natural field experiments, we examine how warning individual retail borrowers that their loan performance will be reported to a public credit registry before and after the loan take-up affects their borrowing behavior. We show that credit warnings reduce default rates by 3.7 to 7 percentage points and increase loan take-up rates by 4.1 percentage points, which suggests that credit warnings benefit both lenders and borrowers. The main drivers appear to be borrowers’ anticipation of a reduction in lenders’ informational rents and improved repayment incentives. Moreover, the reduction in default rates is comparable for borrowers who receive the credit warning before and after the loan take-up. As credit warnings received before but not after a loan take-up can affect the borrower pool, and thus the overall credit risk of the pool, the results suggest that credit warnings have little net effect on the pool’s credit risk due to selection. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Accounting Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 98 (No. 3) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 367-396 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | There is an ongoing debate over uniformity versus flexibility in accounting regulation. This study examines the financial reporting consequences of a rigid accounting rule in China under which the fiscal year-end is uniform for all companies. Using extensive interviews together with large-sample archival analyses, we find that “mismatched” firms—those whose mandated financial reporting cycles are not aligned with their business cycles—exhibit higher levels of absolute abnormal accruals than their nonmismatched counterparts. Further analyses suggest that the negative association between mismatching and financial reporting quality is mainly driven by unintentional estimation errors rather than intentional earnings manipulation. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | Bonissone, Piero P |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Accounting Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 98 (No. 3) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 335-366 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | Regulatory economics suggests that one benefit of public enforcement is the deterrence of improper conduct. Using a difference-in-differences (DiD) design, we investigate whether a deterrence effect follows the revelation of Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) enforcement. We find that large audit firm offices improve audit quality following enforcement naming another office within their firm while small firm offices improve following enforcement of local small firm competitors, with these responses varying by enforcement type. To understand potential mechanisms for the geographic deterrence effect, we examine the first occurrence of a revoked PCAOB registration within a market and find that results are stronger if there is greater news coverage or if nonsanctioned firms are in closer proximity to the sanctioned auditor. Supplemental tests reveal that results are stronger when nonsanctioned auditor clients are similar to the sanctioned firm’s clientele. Our findings suggest a positive but varied deterrence effect following PCAOB enforcement. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | Kubick, Thomas R. ,Yijun Li |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Accounting Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 98 (No. 3) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 307-333 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | We identify executives who have experienced significant accounting-related adverse events during their careers as a powerful setting to examine the extent to which prior professional experience can influence subsequent financial reporting policies. We find that firms led by senior financial executives who have experienced accounting-related adverse events during their careers exhibit greater unconditional accounting conservatism, a lower likelihood of experiencing future accounting-related adverse events, and less positive abnormal discretionary accruals. This effect tends to be stronger when the experience is more frequent, recent, severe, or proximate. Overall, our results reveal a meaningful relationship between managers’ professional experience and accounting policies. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Accounting Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 98 (No. 3) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 285-306 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | I examine whether book-tax differences (BTDs) are mispriced. I predict that BTD mispricing is the operating cash flows-to-price (CFO/P) anomaly in disguise. Using both time-series asset pricing tests and crosssectional returns tests, I provide consistent evidence that returns to trading on BTDs are explained by CFO/P. Rather than being an independent anomaly, the findings indicate that any evidence of BTD mispricing is subsumed by the broader CFO/P anomaly. These findings stand in contrast to many studies that infer BTDs possess unique information for future earnings reflected in stock prices with a delay. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | Hayes, Rachel M.,Xiaoli Tian,Xue Wang |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Accounting Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 98 (No. 3) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 257-283 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | We examine the effects of banking deregulation on bank board policies—specifically, whether deregulation affects the performance and risk exposure measures used in bank CEO turnover decisions. Using the staggered adoption of interstate branching as our setting, we find that bank CEO turnover is more (less) sensitive to stock (accounting) performance after deregulation. We also find that deregulation is associated with a higher sensitivity of bank CEO turnover to the idiosyncratic component of tail risk. Moreover, such changes in turnover policies primarily exist in large banks and federally chartered banks, which are best positioned to exploit growth opportunities, and in banks that expand branch operations after deregulation. Our results indicate an increased emphasis on stock performance and tail risk in turnover decisions when growth opportunities are greater in the deregulated environment. The findings provide evidence that the information used in board decisions varies with features of the competitive environment. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | Glaeser, Stephen [et. al.] |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Accounting Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 98 (No. 3) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 229-255 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | There is limited evidence about when, why, and which individuals incur costs to acquire nonpublic information about a firm, largely due to the difficulty of observing private information acquisition. To overcome this difficulty, we obtain data on Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). We predict and find that perceived information asymmetry between managers and outsiders resulting from both proprietary and agency costs triggers FOIA search. We categorize organizations making FOIA requests using their business descriptions and find that many, including law and intellectual property firms, are not expressly interested in obtaining information for near-term equity trading. Instead, their search activity relates to determinants beyond financial characteristics, including patent litigation and executive turnover. Taken together, we provide evidence on private information search by a relatively unexamined set of organizations and shed new light on the function of the SEC’s Office of FOIA Services. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Accounting Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 98 (No. 3) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 203-228 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | In this study, we examine whether firms respond to internal control weaknesses (ICWs) by requiring accounting-specific skills when hiring rank-and-file employees. Using unique data containing an extensive collection of job postings, we document significant increases in firms’ job postings that list accounting skills after the disclosure of an ICW. This effect is more pronounced for firms with better financial resources and when ICWs are more severe or personnel-related. In addition, our results extend to employees that are not specifically designated as accountants, suggesting a broader role for rank-and-file employees in influencing internal control quality. Finally, we find that increases in job postings with accounting skill requirements are associated with improvements in internal controls and a higher likelihood of ICW remediation. Overall, our findings shed new light on how firms respond to ineffective internal controls by increasing their emphasis on accounting skills in their workforce. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Accounting Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 98 (No. 3) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 175-202 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | Can managers use monetary incentives to elicit cooperation from workers they cannot reward for their efforts? I study “conduit incentives,” an innovative incentive design, whereby managers influence bonus-ineligible workers’ effort by offering bonus-eligible employees a monetary reward for performance that critically depends on the cooperation of the bonus-ineligible workers. Motivated by the reward, bonus-eligible employees use social motivators to elicit cooperation from their ineligible colleagues. I examine an intervention in a California hospital in which a one-time bonus program aimed to improve handwashing compliance. State regulation prevented physicians from receiving bonus payments. However, because physicians’ handwashing counted toward the bonus-related goal, bonus-eligible workers used social pressure to incentivize physicians’ performance, absent any tangible benefits for the physicians. The physicians improved performance during the intervention, and their improvements persisted beyond the removal of the incentives. The response to the temporary intervention significantly predicted the persistence of the performance improvements. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Accounting Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 98 (No. 3) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 153-173 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | In a quasi-experiment with external (EA), in-house internal (IIA), and outsourced internal auditors (OIA) as participants in their natural roles, we compare auditors’ internal control evaluations in the presence of differing management reporting motives. Grounded in Organizational Identity (OID) Theory, we find EAs’ evaluations are more (less) lenient when management’s motive is less (more) self-serving. We provide evidence that management’s motives affect EAs’ evaluations because management is a conduit for EAs’ OID and because EAs adopt an affiliative protective orientation. In contrast, we find no evidence management’s motives affect IIAs’ evaluations or that management is an OID conduit for IIAs. Finally, we find that although OIAs and IIAs exhibit similar OID levels, on average, OIAs’ evaluations are more lenient than IIAs’. Our results clarify how auditors form OID, how it manifests into protective behaviors, and suggest EAs’ preference to rely on OIAs’ work over IIAs’ may inadvertently diminish audit quality. |