| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The World Bank Economic Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 23-55 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | The meaning and identification of poverty are examined using three indicators of standard of living in the North Indian village of Palanpur. The first is intended as a measure of "apparent prosperity" based on the personal assessments of investigators after intensive field work in the village over the full agricultural year 1983-84. The other two are income in 1983-84, and a measure of permanent income obtained by averaging incomes from four surveys conducted over a twenty -six-year interval. A comparison of these three indicators shows that income measured in any one year may give a misleading impression of the incidence of poverty. The risk of poverty for households is calculated. Vulnerability is high among low-caste households and those which are involved in agricultural labor. Categories, however, are not homogeneous; for example, whereas the landless and widows are more likely to be poor, some of such household are quite well off. It is argued that poverty in a good agricultural year is a better indicator of sustained poverty than poverty in a bad year. Occupational mobility out of agricultural labor is low, and changes in the distribution of land are largely accounted for by demographic processes such as household splits. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The World Bank Economic Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 57-82 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | Analysis of the effects of policy changes on the poor is often hindered by the difficulties inherent in measuring poverty and comparing levels of poverty before and after policy changes. This article outlines two techniques which can overcome many of these measurement problems: stochastic dominance conditions, which can facilitate a robust poverty ranking of distributions of living standards; and a decomposable poverty index, which allows measured changes in aggregate poverty to be disaggregated into their various components, such as the changes among population subgroups, and growth and redistributive components. These techniques can be applied to a wide range of indicators of economic well-being and poverty lines, and to assumptions about the poor. The approaches are illustrated using household survey data from Indonesia before and after external shocks and the subsequent structural adjustment program in the mid-1980s. The study finds that favorable initial conditions and a pro-poor pattern of growth enabled Indonesia to maintain its momentum in poverty alleviation during the period. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The World Bank Economic Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 135-153 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | This article explores the nature of property rights systems, their evolution, and their effect on resource allocation. It is argued that certain institutional arrangements for land rights have evolved in order to reduce uncertainty and increase efficiency in credit as well as in land markets. Of particular relevance to developing countries, the article emphasizes the contribution of public sector infrastructure to effective land rights systems. An appendix to the article presents a formal model analyzing the effects of security of land rights on land prices, the intensity of cultivaton, and the use of credit. Empirical evidence from Thailand supports several of the proporsitions derived from the model. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The World Bank Economic Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 93-111 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | Economists have generally argued that if a land tax is administratively feasible, then to increase efficiency it should be used to the exclusion of output taxes. This article shows that underlying this policy prescription is the assumption that institutions for pooling and spreading production risks are perfect. When account is taken of the imperfections in those institutions, some use of output taxes woll be Pareto superior to a pure land tax regime and may induce higher output, as well. Henry George was wrong! These results generally apply even when the land tax is indexed to regional output, and when land is farmed under sharecroping. Even in these cases, a move from a pure land tax is indexed to regional output, and when land is farmed under sharecropping. Even in these cases, a move from a pure land tax to a mix of low and low output taxes will reduce preexisting distortions in both consumption and production arising from the imperfection in risk markets. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The World Bank Economic Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 85-91 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | Deskripsi abstrak ringkas tidak tersedia untuk artikel ini. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The World Bank Economic Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 155-175 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | This article uses cross-sectional evidence from Ghana, Kenya, and Rwanda in 1987-88 to examine the question, Are indigenous land systems in Sub-Saharan Africa a constrain on productivity? The evidence supports the hypothesis suggested by historical studies, that african indigenous land rights systems have spontaneously evolved from systems of communal control towards individualized rights in response to increases in commercialization and population pressure. Cross-sectional data on the incidence of land improvements and on land yields provide little support for the view that limitations under indigeneous law on the right to transfer land are a constraint on productivity. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The World Bank Economic Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 113-133 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | The land tax enjoys a distinguished pedigree in the theoretical literature on tax efficiency, yet it is rarely used as a serious revenue source in rural areas of developing countries. This article considers three drawbacks of the land tax relative to taxes on exports or marketed output: (1) capitalization effects of the land tax impose a large burden on the current generation, (2) land taxation increases the riskiness of net farmer income, and (3) administration of land tax entails costly informational requirements. This article demonstates that only the second and third drawbacks are valid economic arguments against the land tax. Simulations based on an economic model of farm behavior suggest that farmers may still prefer a land tax to an export tax despite the increased uncertainty of their after-tax income. Administerative costs are therefore the best explanation of the weak link between the theoretical and practical aspects of land taxation. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | Anthony B. Atkinson, Jonathan Skinner, Shem Migot-Adholla et al., Karla Hoff, Karla Hoff, Feder, Gershon, David Feeny, Martin Ravallion, Monika Huppi, Stern, Nicholas, Peter Lanjouw |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The World Bank Economic Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 3-21 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | Studies comparing poverty in different countries frequently inform the evaluation of past policies and the formulation of future policies for reducing poverty. If the comparisons are to be a valid foundation for such assessments, in particular if they are to be a guide to the effective allocation of funds, the underlying concepts must be examined and defined. This article discussed four issues that are critical in this respect: the choice of poverty indicator, the determination of the poverty line, the unit of analysis, and the choice of equivalence scale. A selection of studies of poverty in countries that belong to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development is used to show how the choices made in defining these indicators affect the findings about the extent and composition of the poor population. Although the context is different, the experience of rich countries may yield useful lessons for developing countries. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The World Bank Economic Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 271-295 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | Thailand has sought to increase farmers` access to credit by government intervention. In 1966 it created a government agricultural bank to lend solely to farm households, and beginning in the late 1970s it requiered commercial banks to lend heavily in the rural sector, either directly or by by making deposits in the agricultural bank. The result was an enormous expansion of credit in the rural sector. But because formal lenders were either unable or unwilling to solve the information problems involved in the broad range of rural creditor transactions, the informal credit sector (which charged interest rates many times higher than the formal sector) continued to thrive. Using household surveys and surveys of moneylenders, this article provides a detailed analysis of the ways in which lenders in the informal sector have solved the information problems of providing credit. The authors argue that the informal sector is competitive, and that high interest rates reflect high information costs, not the scarcity of funds. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The World Bank Economic Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 351-366 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | A major problem for institutional lenders is ensuring that borrowers exercise prudence in the use of the funds so that the likehood of repayment is enhanced. One partial solution is peer monitoring : having neighbors who are in a good position to monitor the borrower be required to pay a penalty if the borrower goes bankrupt. Peer monitoring is largely responsible for the successful financial performance of the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh and of similar group lending program elsewhere. But peer monitoring has a cost. It tranfers risk from the bank, which is in a better position to bear risk, to the cosigner. In a simple model of peer monitoring in a competitive credit market, this article demonstrates that the transfer of the risk leads to an improvement in borrower` welfare. |
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