| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The World Bank Economic Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 219-242 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | This article uses a cross-national data set on the performance of government investment projects financed by the World Bank to examine the link between government efficacy and governance. It demonstrates a strong empirical link between civil liberties and the performance of government projects. Even after controling for other determinants of performance, countries with the strongest civil liberties have projects with an economic rate of return 8-22 percentage points higher than countries with the weakest civil liberties. The strong effect of civil liberties holds true even when controlling for the level of democracy. The interrelationship among civil liberties, civil strife, and project performance suggests that the possible mechanism of causation is from more civil liberties to increased citizen voice to better projects. This results adds to the evidence for the view that increasing citizen voice and public accountability-through both participation and better governance-can lead to greater efficacy in government action. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The World Bank Economic Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 119-143 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | This article investigates the impact of labor market regulations in a setting with incomplete compliance. It takes as its starting point the limited evidence regarding the distortionary costs of labor market regulations and argues that there may exist natural limits to the efficiency losses engendered by such regulations. The article reviews some stylized facts regarding labor market behavior, presents an analytical model that may explain such behavior, and provides a checklist for assessing the distortionary impact of regulations such as minimum wages. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The World Bank Economic Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 85-118 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | This article examines the combined impact of the employment guarantee for graduates and public sector compensation policies on the Egyption labor market. Besides contributing to an unstainable rate of growth in the government labor force, these policies have encouraged queuing for government jobs, contributed to high graduate unemployment rates, and reduced the employment of graduates in the private sector. Despite substantial wage erosion in the public sector in recent years, wages, when appropriately corrected for observed heterogeneity and sample selection, are on a par with, or higher than, private sector wages, especially for graduates. When combined with the more desirable nonwage aspects of government jobs, these compensation levels explain the attractiveness of public sector employment to graduates. Government pay scales are specially advantageous to female secondary school graduates, who appear to face considerable discrimination in the private sector. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The World Bank Economic Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 59-83 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | In many economies, studies have found large wage differentials not accounted for by workforce characteristics, collective bargaining, or market power, Researchers attribute these differentials to either unobserved worker quality or pay incentives designed to elicit worker effort. This article finds empirical support for an alternative explanation: These wage differentials result from firms` technology-generating activities. Using firm-level data from Colombia, Mexico, and Taiwan (China), the article comparesthe effect of research and development, worker training, and exports by employers on the wages of skilled and unskilled workers. The results suggest that technology investment lead to large wage premiums for skilled workers but not for unskilled workers. These wage premiums are primarily the result of investments in research and development and in training, while exporting is relatively less important except in Colombia. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The World Bank Economic Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 33-57 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | The experience of East Asia in the 1960s and 1970s supports the theory that greater openness to trade tends to narrow the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers in developing countries. In Latin Amarica since the mid 1980s, however, increased openness has widened wage differentials. This conflict of evidence is probably not the result of differences between East Asia and Latin America. Instead, the conflict is probably the result of differences between the 1960s and 1980s, specifically, the entry of China into the world market and, perhaps, the advent of new technology biased against unskilled workers. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The World Bank Economic Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 17-32 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | Recent evidence shows that the returns to labor and the skill premium both increase in developing countries after trade liberalization, despite the low skill content of their exports. The author explains this apparent puzzle by arguing that trade increases technology transfers from industrial to developing countries and that the transfer technology is biased in favor of skilled labor. The relative demand for skilled labor increases during the transition following liberalization, and so the gains enjoyed by skilled labor are temporary, even in the absence of supply responses. The gains become longer lasting when the transferred technology is also skill-biased. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The World Bank Economic Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 1-15 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | In a world of deeping trade links, rapid technological change, and weekening institutions, workers in rich and poor countries alike are concerned about their incomes and the security of their work. In contrast to the substantial quantity of analysis on industrial countries, relatively little careful work has been done on these issues in developing countries, especially in the context of the recent globalization of economic relations. Empirical work suggests that disequalizing trends in some developing countries may have been caused by the entry of low-income countries such as China into world production or by the greater quality and technological requirements of contemporary trade in goods. Whatever the source, these results raise questions about the viability of institutional mechanism for supporting the income security and working conditions of workers. Many labor market regulations are already ineffective owing to weak enforcement capabilities. However, in most developing countries, there will be a rising fraction of workers in formal labor contracts, rising demands for formal mechanism for dealing with income insecurity, and a potentially larger role for unions in an important segment of the workforce. Thus, it is of increasing importance to set the policy and institutional framework in a fashion that is both consistent with competitive pressures and supprotive of workers` participation and security. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The World Bank Economic Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 145-170 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | Noting the trend toward more independent trade unions in developing countries, this article examines whetherthe presence of unions strngthens or weakens the benefits to be gained from economic policy reform. We show that the presence of "passive" unions-ones that choose their wage-employment contract given the firm`s cost-minimizing strategy-increases the welfare gains from trade liberalization,because trade reform lowers the wage premium enjoyed by the unionized sector, reducing the distortion in the labor market. Thse gains are amplified when the unions are "active," namely, when they negotiate a contract with the firm that is off its labor demand curve. Such a contract results in fatherbedding-paying workers more than their marginal product-and trade reform reduces the amount of featherbedding. The policy implication for Bangkadesh-a country with strong trade unions and protected unionized sector-is that the benefits of further trade liberalization may be grater than otherwise predicted. In Indonesia, where both unionization and import tariffs are low, allowing greater independence to unions may preserve flexibility and reward workers better tahn the current minimum-wage policy. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The World Bank Economic Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 171-194 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | This article uses cross-country data to examine the link between a country`s type of political regime and its degree of openneess and labor market distortion. The analysis indicates that more authoritarian regimes are associated with higher trade protection and greater labor market distortions. This supports the view that political authoritarianism may be counterproductive to development in important respects. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The World Bank Economic Review |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 451-485 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | Initiating public enterprise reform is a complex decision influenced by economic factors as well as the ideological biases and personalities of political leaders. Nevertheless, the use of a contracting framework yields important generalizations about what drives the decision. This article argues that the decision depends fundamentally on the potential efficiency gains from the reform and its associated transactions costs. Cost arise because of asymetries in information and opportunism, problems that usually plague contract negotiations. The article identifies observable variables that may affect either the potential gains or the transactions costs, uses them to construct a simple probit decision-making model, and test the model using data from fifteen developing countries over a twenty-year period. |
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