| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The World Bank Research Observer |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 57-80 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | Do the economic gains brought by technological innovation and commercialization in agriculture work their way through to the poor? The prevailing optimistic view is that they do. But this view is not universal: some hold that these forces for change can interact with, or even induce, institutional and market failure, with adverse consequences for the poor. Adherents of the pessimistic view point to real-world instances in which the poor have failed to reap the benefits, or even have lost, from the technological change or commercialization. Where these effects have occurred we find that they are mostly attributable to inelastic demand or adverse institutional features; often, when technology or commercialization has been blamed for the decline in income of the poor, other - not necessarily connected - policies have in fact been responsible for the damage. This article contends that the optimistic view is, by and large, correct: normally, technology and commercialization stimulate agricultural growth, improve employment opportunities, and expand food supply all central to the alleviation of poverty. The evidence does not offer much encouragement to an extension of this view that through "social engineering" the benefits from technology and commercialization can easily be targeted toward the poor; the limited opportunities for such targeting should of course be seized. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The World Bank Research Observer |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 105-127 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | There is an urgent need to provide an effective safety net for the poorest in societies ranging from socialist countries undergoing reform to sub-Saharan African economies. This article examines social security systems in industrial countries and explores their relevance to developing countries. The objective of social security is defined broadly as public action, including that by communities, to protect the poor and vulnerable from adverse changes in living standards. Relevant instruments include employment and income guarantees, and also such formal policy instruments as assistance, social insurance, and family allowances. The article highlights issues that arise in providing social security in developing countries, particularly its effectiveness protecting the target groups. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The World Bank Research Observer |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 37-56 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | Organized labor is usually viewed as an obstacle to labor market adjustment. But unions` responses to adjustment programs in fact range from militant opposition to acquiescence or even explicit cooperation. Three sets of variables shape these responses: the strength and characteristics of the union movement itself; economic cycles; and political institutions and their ties to unions. - Strength of the labor movement: In industrial democracies, an aggressive stance on wages tends to be associated with moderately strong unions. Small or weak unions are less militant, as might expected; more surprisingly, large and powerful unions also tend to be more moderate, primarily because of their greater participation in consultation and decisionmaking at the national level. The experience in developing countries is somewhat different: only a few of these have strong labor movements, and among these, militancy is common. The large share of wage labor in the public sector complicates comparisons with industrial nations, since governments as employers clearly behave differently from private employers, particularly in hard times. - Economic cycles: Depression almost invariably reduces militancy indeveloping as well as industrial nations - Political institutions: The nature of the political regime - democratic or authoritarian - is only roughly associated with how government handle labor relations, and correspondingly with the options available to unions. More important in shaping unions` behavior are the nature of the political party system and how unions are connected with parties. The conditions needed to gain workers` cooperation are analogous to those which encourage business to invest: political stability, a voice in policy that affects their interests, and, arising from these, the confidence that current sacrifices will ultimately yield a fair share of future benefits. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The World Bank Research Observer |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 19-36 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | Does trade with developing countries have a small and benign effect on workers in industrial countries, as most economists have maintained, or a large and adverse effect, as the general public and advocates of protection believe? A Review of the evidence suggests that neither of these positions is tenable. The methods that economists have conventionally used to measure the effect of North-South trade are biased downward. The true size of this effect remains uncertain, but some recent studies suggest that it is much larger than previously estimade. Trade with the South has probably significantly altered the sectoral composition of employment in the North, shifting workers out of manufacturing and into nontraded services. More important, it has probably significantly worsened the relative economic position of inskilled workers in industrial countries, and may also have aggravated the problem of reconciling low inflation with low unemployment. Even so, the adverse side effects of trade with the South are much smaller than is popularly supposed. And the popular remedy - protection - is clearly wrong. What is needed instead is more action by governments to soffset the reduction in the relative demand for unskilled labor through training and education, job creation, and income redistribution. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | William J. Baumol, Adrian Wood, Nelson, Joan M. , Ehtisham Ahmad, Binswanger, Hans P. , Braun, Joachim von , William McCleary |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The World Bank Research Observer |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 1-17 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | The design of policies to improve economic efficiency using the private sector as principal agent requires a clear understanding of the role of market structure. Contestability analysis, not ten years old, provides a tool for the purpose. The concept can guide the government that wants to have it both ways: to protect the public and smaller firms from the threat of monopolistic behavior by large firms, at the same time allowing the larger firms enough freedom to meet the requirements of efficiency and to exercise entrepreneurship. Perfect contestability provides a standard for ideal market behavior. A perfectly contestable market is one in which entry and exit are perfectly costless; in such a market, the mere (perpetual) threat of entry can enforce good conduct by incumbents. So long as sunk costs are zero, a potential entrant can undercut any excessive prices (or unnecessary costs) of incumbent firms yet earn an attractive rate of return. Thus perfect contenstability precludes excessive profits and prices as well as waste and inefficiency, and it prevents predatory pricing. What contenstability analysis means for policy in developing countries is that an economy that wishes to take advantage of available economies of scale can use the norms of behavior provided by the theory as a guide for regulation of its larger firms, instead of resorting to nationalization or to stifling restrictions as the means to protect its infant industries and its consumers. Under this standard, the bounds on the firms` behavior set by the regulations replicate those that would be enforced by market pressures in an ideal state of perfect contestability. The article gives a Nigerian example in which regulatory changes applying the theory promise to improve the performance of the electric utility market. Such methods can do more to promote the public interest that privatization, which often results in replacement of a state monopoly by a private monopoly. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The World Bank Research Observer |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 259-280 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | Advocates argue that voucher programs can correct the incentive problems of education systems in developing economies. An accountability perspective, based on a principal-agent framework, was developed to clarify the arguments for and againts education vouchers. An assessment of findings on voucher programs in industrial countries and a review of voucher or quasi-voucher experiences in Bangladesh, Chile, Colombia, Cote d`Ivoire, and the Czech Republic support the usefulness of the analytic framework. The assessment concludes that the policy relevance of voucher programs for developing economies remains uncertain. Major voucher initiatives have been attempted only in countries with a well-developed institutional infrastructure. Some studies find favorable benefits for at least some population groups, but others find limited effects and evidence of increasing social stratification in schools. Whether vouchers lead to better outcomes or greater stratification in schools. Whether vouchers lead to better outcomes or greater stratification appears related to specific contexts, institutional variables, and program designs. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The World Bank Research Observer |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 199-230 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | Over the past dozen years, policymakers have largely abandoned long-standing popular approaches for adressing risk in agriculture without fully resolving the question of how best to manage the negative consequences of volatile agricultural markets. The article reviews the transition from past policies and describes current approaches that distinguish between the trade-related fiscal consequences of commodity market volatility and the consequences of price and production risks for vulnerable rural households and communities. Current policies rely more heavily on markets, even though markets for risk are incomplete in numerous ways. The benefits and limitations of market-based instruments are examined in the context of risk management strategies, and innovative approaches to extend the reach of risk markets are discussed. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The World Bank Research Observer |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 231-257 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | How does an oil boom affect the forest cover of tropical oil-exporting countries? What macroeconomic linkages and policies are decisive? A comparison of research findings on longrun land-use changes in eight tropical developing economies reveals that the direct physical impacts of the oil industry on forests are unquestionably less than its derived macroeconomic impact. In most cases oil wealth indirectly but significantly protects tropical forests. The core mechanism is that oil rents cause macroeconomic ``Dutch disease`` decreasing the price competitiveness of agriculture and logging, strongly diminishing pressures for forest degradation and deforestation. But domestic policy responses to oil wealth are also vital determinants of the forest outcome. When governments use oil wealth for urban spending sprees, this reinforces the core effect by pulling more labor out of land-using and forest degrading activities. When oil revenues finance road construction or frontier colonization, however, the core forest-protective effect can be reserve. Repeated currency devaluation and import protection of land using domestic sectors also increase pressures on forest. Other international capital transfer, like bilateral credits, aid, or debt relief, can have impact similar to those of oil wealth, either alleviating pressures on forest or aggravating specific forest-detrimental policies. These insights point to forest-friendly safeguards that can realistically be made in the design of structural adjustment programs, considering the important tradeoffs between development and conservation objectives. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The World Bank Research Observer |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 171-197 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | Governments the world over offer significant inducements to attract investment, motivated by the expectation of spillover benefits to augment the primary benefits of a boost to national income from new investment. There are several possible sources of induced spillovers from foreign direct investment. This article evaluates the empirical evidence on productivity, wage, and export spillovers in developing, developed, and transition economies. Although theory can identify a range of possible spillover channels, robust empirical support for positive spillovers is at best mixed. The article explores the reasons and concludes with a review of policy aspects. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | Martin Ravallion, Shaohua Chen, Holger Gorg, Greenaway, David, Sven Wunder, William D. Sunderlin, Donald F. Larson, Jock R. Anderson, Panos Varangis, Varun Gauri, Ayesha Vawda |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The World Bank Research Observer |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 141-169 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | A new assessment is made of the developing world`s progress againts poverty. By the frugal $ a day standard there were 1.1 billion poor people in 2001-almost 400 million fewer than 20 year earlier. During that period in the number of poor people declined by more than 400 million in China, though half the decline was in the early 1980s and the number outside China rose slightly. At the same time the number of people in the world living on less than $2 a day rose, so that there has been a market bunching up of people living between $1 and $2 a day. Sub-Saharan Africa has become the region with the highest incidence of extreme poverty and the greatest depth of poverty. If these trends continue, the 1990 aggreaget $1 a day poverty rate will be halved by 2015, meeting the millennium Development Goal, though only east and South Asia will reach this goal. |
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