| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The World Bank Research Observer |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 125-147 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | As recent discussions have made clear, the apparent lack of poverty reduction in the face of historically high rates of economic growth-both in the worlad as a whole and in specific countries (most notably India)-provides fuel for the argument that economic growth does little to reduce poverty. How confident can we be that the data actually support these inferences? At the international level, the regular revision of purchasing power parity exchange rates plays havoc with the poverty estimates, changing them in ways that have little or nothing to do with the actual experience of the poor. At the domestic level, the problems in measuring poverty are important not only for the world count but also for tracking income poverty within individual countries. Yet, in many countries, there are large and growing discrepancies between the survey data-the source of poverty counts-and the national accounts-the source of the measure of economic growth. Thus economic growth, as measured, has at best a weak relationship with poverty, as measured. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The World Bank Research Observer |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 149-156 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | - |
| Nama Pengarang | : | T. N. Srinivasan, Martin Ravallion, Deaton, Angus , Hayami, Yujiro, Rinku Murgai, Mubarik Ali, Byerlee, Derek , Raj M. Desai, Itzhak Goldberg |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The World Bank Research Observer |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 157-168 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | - |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The World Bank Research Observer |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 41-57 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | The Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s not only highlighted the welfare consequences of transparency in the financial sector but also linked this relatively narrow problem to the broader context of transparency in governance. It has been observed that objections to transparency, often on flimsy pretexts, are common even in industrialized countries. This article argues that transparency is indispensable to the financial sector and describes its desirable characteristics: acces, timeliness, relevance, and quality. The authors emphasize the need to weigh the costs and benefits of a more transparent regulatory policy, and they explore the connection between information imperfections, macroeconomic policy, and questions of risk. The article argues for developing institutional infrastructure, standards, and accounting practices that promote transparency, implementing incentives for disclosure and establishing regulations to minimize the perverse incentives generated by safety net arrangements, such as deposit insurance. Because institutional development is gradual, the authors contend that relatively simple regulations, such as limits on credit expansion, may be the most reasonable option for developing countries. They show that transparency has absolute limits because of the lack of adequate enforcement and argue that adequate enforcement may be predicated on broader reforms in the public sector. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The World Bank Research Observer |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 109-124 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | This paper examines the design of social investment funds (SIFS) and explores the ways they affect agents` incentives to propose, select, and implement good projects. Compared with other forms of decentralized service provision, SIFS posses features of administratively delegated authority and deep political devolution. Where existing political instituitions fail to deliver assistance to vulnerable groups, a well-designed SIF may represent a useful administrative alternative. This article reviews several features that provide incentives for both SIF staff and project beneficaries and concludes with practical guidelines for designing and appraising social investment funds. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The World Bank Research Observer |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 85-107 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | Although the link between improved infrastructure services and economic growth is uncertain, it is clear that reforms aimed at creating competition and regulating natural monopolies establish and environment conducive to private sector participation, incentives for companies to strive for efficiency savings that can ultimately be passed on to consumers, and greater provision of servicesw (such as faster roll-out of infrastructure or innovative solutions to service delivery for customers not connected to an existing network). In determining the form that infrastructure restructuring might undertake or the design of a regulatory agency, policymakers can generally benefit from a review of the experiences of other countries. A key element of any decisionmaking process should be a review of how the various types of reform will affect the efficiency ofthe sector and whether they will increase private financing of its significant investment needs. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The World Bank Research Observer |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 59-84 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | Unless developing countries embrance a corporate governance perspective, privatization is unlikely to provide the benefits of improved performance with accountability. This article introduces the concept of governance chains that can constrain the grabbing hands of public and private actors by providing information and accountability mechanisms to help investors monitor managers. Empirical data on established firms from 49 countries provide estimates of the relative importance and strength of private and formal chains of governance. The framework and empirical benchmarks help explain the outcomes of past privatizations and suggest certain steps that governments can pursue to be sure to get the most out of future privatization activity. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The World Bank Research Observer |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 1-18 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | Economists seeking explanations for the glabal financial of 1997-1999 are reaching consensus that a major factor was weak financial institutions, which resulted in part from inadequate government regulations. At the same time many developing countries are struggling with an overregulated financial system-one that stifles innovation and the flow of credit to new entrepreneurs and that can stunt the growth of well-established firms. In particular, too many countries are relying excessively on capital adequacy standards, which are inefficient and sometimes counterproductive. The authorargues that financial systems can be reformed successfully using a ``dynamic portfolio approach`` aimed at managing the incentives and contraints that affect not only financial institutions` exposure to risk but also their ability to cope with it. The article sets out general principles of financial regulation and shows how the dynamic portfolio approach can help countries deal with the special problems that arise during the transition to a more liberalized economy as well as those that arise in dealing with a financial crisis similar to the 1997 crisis in East Asia. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | Claessens, Stijn , Daniela Klingebiel, Stiglitz, Joseph E., Alexander Dyck, Antonio Estache, William Jack, Tara Vishwanath, Daniel Kaufmann |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The World Bank Research Observer |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 19-40 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | This article analyzes the costs and benefits of different degrees of competition and different configurations of permissible activities in the financial sector and discusses the related implications for regulation and supervision. Theory and experience demonsrtate the importance of competition for efficiency and confirm that competitive environment requires a contesable system-meaning one that is open to competition-but not necessarily a large number of institutions. A competitive banking system can improve the distribution of consumer credit, enhance the corporate sector`s access to financing, and mitigate the risks of financial crises. In an open market, in which services and products are provided in response to market signals, financial institutions respond by offering a wider scope of financial services. The optimal institutional design for supervisory functions is less obvious. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The World Bank Research Observer |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 251-264 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | Thev phrase `` Washiington Consensus `` has become a familiar term in development policy circles in recent years, but it is now used in several different senses, causing a great deal of confosion. In this article the author distinguishes between his original meaning as a summary of the lowest common denominator of policy advice addressed by the Washington based institutions (including the World Bank) and subsequent use of the term to signifyneoliberal or market-fundamentalist policies. He argues that the latter policies could not be expected to provide an effective framework for combating poverty but that the original advice is still broadly valid. The article discusses alternative ways of addressing the confusion. It argues that any policy manifesto designed to eliminate poverty needs to go beyond the original version but concludes by cautioning that no consensus on a wider agenda currently exists. |
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