| Nama Pengarang | : | Jyotirmoy Sarkar, Barnali Gupta, Debashis Pal, James Stodder, Stephen Buckles, Watts, Michael, Cecilia A. Conrad, Hansen, W. Lee, William E. Becker, David A. Hennessy, John H. Bishop, Rajshree Agarwal, A. Edward Day, Siegfried, John J., Bonnie T. Meszaros |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Journal of Economic Education |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 118-126 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | - |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Journal of Economic Education |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 88-92 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | - |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Journal of Economic Education |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 3-10 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | - |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Journal of Economic Education |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 23-31 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | - |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Journal of Economic Education |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 54-64 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | - |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Journal of Economic Education |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 41-46 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | - |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Journal of Economic Education |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 72-80 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | - |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Journal of Economic Education |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 14-22 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | I have presented here a graphical model in which a representative criminal chooses between two bads; time served in jail and good behavior. Both bads impose disutility, ceteris paribus, so indifference curves are truly unusual, being concave to the origin, with higher indifference curves showing lower utility and hence a lower crime rate. The model permits at least five exercises for use in the intermediate microeconomics course. First, getting tough on crime entails shifting the budget constraint. Second, any given crime rate can be achieved at lower cost by raising the sentence and increasing the reward for good behavior. Third, as a corollary to the above, if society offers no reduction in time served in exchange for good behavior, the cost of achieving a given crime rate is maximized. Fourth, minimum sentences are inefficient, for any crime rate achieved by imposing minimum sentences on criminals, the same crime rate can be achieved at lower cost by raising the sentence and eliminating the minimum sentence. Fifth, when politicians impose determinate sentences, while yielding to the reality of prison crowding and high construction costs, they may reduce sentence length while insiting on full service. If this combination results in a sufficiently shorter sentence length, policymakers will unintentionally raise the crime rate. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Journal of Economic Education |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 65-71 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | - |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | The Journal of Economic Education |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 81-87 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | - |
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