| Abstraksi Narasi |
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The political situation in Indonesia took a distinct turn for the worse in September and early October. Nine people were officially reported killed in riots in the Jakarta port suburb of Tanjung Priok in September; unofficial estimates put the toll of both dead and injured somewhat higher. In early October bombs exploded in three different locations in Jakarta`s business, district, including two offices of the Bank Central Asia in which the well-known Chinese entrepreneur, Liem Siew Liong, has a controlling interest. The three explosions killed only two people, and injured about 20, but they are an alarming indication that political dissidents in Indonesia may be resorting to the techniques of urban terrorism so familiar in other parts of the world.
On the economic front as well there were signs that the recovery from the recession of 1982, which seemed to be gathering strength in 1983 and early 1984, was faltering. As the US dollar gained againts almost all other currencies in August and early September there was an inevitable rush to convert rupiah into dollars, leading to a rapid rise in the Jakarta inter-bank interest rate in early September. Although Bank Indonesia made available a special creit facility in late September which at least temporaly eased the liquidity problems of many private banks, concern was expressed that the underlying cause of these problems lay in more deeply rooted difficulties in macroeconomic management. In real terms, narrow money supply growth was negative in the year ending August 31, 1984. This was due in part to the contractionary impact of the central government, and in part to a rapid growth in time deposits, particularly with the state banks, which in turn have apparently been depositingsome of their funds abroad. Accompanying this slow growth in money supply has been an upward pressure on interest rates at a time when the rate of inflation is falling.
For those concerned with longer run problems of growthin Indonesia, the most recent data on national income and output offer only moderate encouragement. Although GDP rose by over 4% in real terms in 1983, national income rose by a much smaller amount; in per capita terms, national income has grown at only 0.5% per annum in 1981-3, compared with 7% per annum in 1979-1981. Manufacturing output remains stagnant, and the growth which has occurred in foodcrop production in 1983 and 1984 has caused a substantial accumulation of stocks with the national food procurement agency. There seems little doubt that the economy needs some fiscal stimulus if it is to return to the growth path laid down in Repelita IV. |