| Nama Pengarang | : | Ray Trewin, Malcolm Bosworth, Kelly Bird, Ron Duncan, Marcel P. Timmer, Emmanuel Skoufias, Lisa A. Cameron, Lloyd R. Kenward, Henry Sandee |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | Bies: Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 133-139 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | - |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | Bies: Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 119-124 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | - |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | Bies: Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 59-84 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | This paper explores the continuing labour market dilemmas resulting from the expansion of upper secondary and higher education in Indonesia. The situation is more acute in the poorer provinces such as East Nusa Tenggara (NTT) with their limited demand for high school graduates. The findings presented here are based on a sample of 800 high school students in the West Timor region of NTT. The authors point to the problems inherent in the Indonesian government`s goal of nine years` compulsory education by the year 2004, and suggest policy measures to avoid the wastage of talent in provinces such as East Nusa Tenggara. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | Bies: Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 5-36 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | Indonesia`s economic collapse is the most profound to affect any significant market-oriented economy in decades. It is certainly far sharper than the recession of the early 1960s. Replacing President Soeharto with President Habibie has not led to a significant improvement in immediate economic prospects, although the resumption of external assistance by the interlational community will mitigate the extent of the collapse. Even so, the private sector, both local and foreign, remains wary about extending its economic activities. While the financial `vultures` may be circling, they have not begun to land, as they are now doing in Thailand. The financial stresses are telling in the community, with a sharp rise in violence against property and persons. Looting, organised and otherwise, has been taking place since the second quarter of the year, mainly, but not exclusively, in Java. These activities are further undermining the capacity of the government to encourage investment. IMF funding to Indonesia resumed at the end of July after a break of over six months. At its annual meeting in Paris, international aid consortium, the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI), agreed to increase its lending. The meeting also resolved to reschedule some of Indonesia`s official debt repayments in order to ease fiscal stress, since taxation revenue is expected to collapse (in real terms), while the rupiah value of external debt repayments will rise sharply because of the currency`s weakness. A potentially important breakthrough in attacking the problem of short-term private sector debt was achieved with the Frankfurt Accord of late June, which led to the establishment of the Indonesian Debt Restructuring Agency, INDRA. In early September an initiative to ease domestic debt was unveiled: called the Jakarta Initiative, the processb establishes a range of consultative mechanisms aimed at expediting negotiations between lenders and borrowers, with a view to debt rescheduling and write-downs. Recently created commercial courts, which will implement the new bankruptcy law, opened for business in late August. Several cases are now being heard. The Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) closed a number of banks and nationalised several others in August. Nationalisations included two of the top three private sector banks, Bank Central Asia and Bank Danamon. At the time of writing, deadlines set by the government for bank owners to hand over assets to IBRA in repayment if central bank loans had apparently been met by the Salim Group (BCA) and the Gajah Tunggal Group (Bank Dagang Nasional Indonesia). However, recent government announcements suggest that the loans will after all be repaid in cash and that the deadline has been extended by five years (Kompas, 30/9/98). |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | Bies: Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 85-113 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | How will rapid East Asian industrialisation and international trade policy reforms affect Indonesia`s economy? Taking an economy-wide perspective and drawing on projections to 2005, based on a global applied general equilibrium model (GTAP), we show the impact of Uruguay Round implementation, and explore other international influences on Indonesia`s and neighbouring economies. Trade reforms likely to accompany China`s (and Taiwan`s) membership of the WTO are projected to boost the competitiveness of Indonesia`s primary sectors at the expense of light manufacturing and the overall economy, while failure by OECD countries to honour Unguruay Round obligations to open their textile and clothing markets would reduce industrialisation in the region, slowing growth in its net food imports. The benefits to Indonesia of APEC liberalisations are also reported. All projections were completed in 1997 before the enormity of the financial crisis became clear, follow-on research should quantify the growth slowdown`s impact on these results. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | Bies: Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 37-58 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | In an effort to control increases in the prices of certain tradable commodities in recent years, the Indonesian government has xeperimented with a variety of policy interventions. Palm oil is important both as an export commodity and for household consumption in the form of cooking oil. We examine a palm export tax policy that ran from September 1994 through June 1997. We find that the taxes did reduce the domestic prices of palm oil products, and we estimate their effects on the distribution of income within Indonesia. Notably, we find that they actually reduced revenues of the government, and lowered profits for palm oil refiners. We also examine the efficiency effects and other aspects of the taxes. Finally, we discuss more drastic export restraints imposed more recently by the government during the economic crisis. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | William E. James, Jacqueline Pomeroy, Stephen V. Marks, Donald F. Larson, Pangestu, Mari, Kym Anderson, Kevin Evans, Gavin W. Jones et al, Timothy Lindsey |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | Bies: Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 115-118 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | - |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | Bies: Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 61-66 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | - |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | Bies: Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 3-60 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | This survey covers one of the most tumultuous periods in Indonesia`s economic and social history---from February to early June 1998. A meltdown in the economy and devastating riots forced President Soeharto`s resignation on 21 May, moving Indonesia into uncharted waters. A key issue in coming months will be the development of new political laws and institutional infrastructure, culminating in a general election expected in early 1999. New President Habibie is expected to oversee the political transformation as an interim president. A stable political climate is a precondition for the return of confidence and capital. The economy continues to fall sharply--an uncertain and volatile backdrop to the political reform process--and extreme economic pressures will make it difficult to maintain social order. The economy was brought to its knees by a collapse in confidence and in the exchange rate. The government had sought help from the IMF in October 1997, and agreements of financial assistance and reforms designed to rebuild confidence were signed on 31 October (IMF I) and 15 January (IMF II) (Soesastro and Basri 1998, pp. 10-26), but these attempts to restore economic stability failed for a variety of reasons. Relations between the IMF and the governmet were strained by a proposal to introduce a currency board system (CBS) and by slippage in implementation of a greed reforms. Off-budget and broad ranging government subsidisation of commodity prices was introduced to contain social unrest in the lead-up the March presidential election. The relationship with the IMF improved during negotiation of the third program (IMF III), which was released on.10 April, but with a significant delay in the payment of IMF funds. IMF III built on previous structural policy measures, tightened monetary policy, and brought targeted subsidies onto the budget, setting a schedule for their gradual withdrawal. The IMF is reviewing its third program in the light of a further sharp deterioration in economic and financial conditions. An agreement has been reached that will ease the burden on Indonesia`s private sector offschore debt, alleviating one source of pressure on the exchange rate. It involves a government guaranteed exchange rate for sevicing offshore corposed commercial courts should provide a legal remedy for lenders and apply pressure to borrowers. The banking sector, which is dysfunctional and in serious trouble, has been kept afloat by liquidity support from Bank Indonesia (BI). A massive depositor run on BCA---Indonesia`s largest private bank-- because of its connections with the Soeharto family, has placed added stress on the financial system. The Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) is the key player in reform of the banking sector, but the jury is still out on its performance. The weak exchange rate, the large monetary expansion to support banks, and a severe drougth (which caused food shortages in some areas) have sharply increased inflation. Food supplies (including imports) appear adequate, but vastly higher food prices and rising unemployment make food affordability a serious concern. Panic buying, hoarding and food distribution problems have occurred. Rioting sparked by price rises has compounded the latter by destroying some outlets and infrastructure. Student protests demanding cheaper food prices and political reform gained momentum around the country, leading to President Soeharto`s resignation. Two factors instrumental in his downfall were the 71% petrol price increase on 4 May, which led to intensified rioting, and the killing of four students at Trisakti University, which triggered devastating riots in Jakarta on 13-14 May. Following Soeharto`s resignation, businesses associated with his family are suffering a financial and community backlash. It is likely to take several years for economic activity to recover to its pre-crisis level. Factors that woulds assist this process include: - increased budgetary financial aid, so that fiscal policy supports rather than contracts the economy, providing a greater chance of maintaining social stability; - a disciplined and hard working government that collaborates well with the IMF in order to win back confidence and credibility; - interest rates that are sufficiently high to induce savers to keep money in banks rather than spend it as a against inflation; - swift banking sector restructuring under IBRA, including the closure of dysfunctional banks, to establish a core group of banks in which people have confidence; - urgent follow-up to allow operation of the mechanisms that have been put in place to facilitate trade financing, ease private sector offshore debt, and provide legal remedies for lenders; and - a scheme to address the domestic private sector debt problem. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | Bies: Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | - |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 143-157 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | The increasing number of human health problems caused by the use of pesticides serves as a warning to countries to develop preventive programs. Developing countries, however, are concerned about the effect of such programs on household incomes. With Indonesia as a case study, this paper presents a procedure to broaden a Social Accounting Matrix to include the impact of agricultural pesticide use on human health. This approach utilises the Constrained Fixed Price Multiplier method to analyse the effect, on the household incomes of different socio-economic classes, of government programs that are designed to reduce human pesticide-related illnesses. The results show that reducing such illnesses through the Safe Use of Pesticides program or the Integrated Pest Management program induces a more equal income distribution. |
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