| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | Analisa |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | XVI-1, JANUARI (No. 1) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 70-77 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | Deskripsi abstrak ringkas tidak tersedia untuk artikel ini. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | Soebadio Haryati |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | Analisa |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | XVI-1, JANUARI (No. 1) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 56-69 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | Deskripsi abstrak ringkas tidak tersedia untuk artikel ini. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | Soepardjo Rustam |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | Analisa |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | XVI-1, JANUARI (No. 1) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 43-55 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | Deskripsi abstrak ringkas tidak tersedia untuk artikel ini. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | A.M.W. Pranarka |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | Analisa |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | XVI-1, JANUARI (No. 1) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 19-42 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | - |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | Analisa |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | XVI-1, JANUARI (No. 1) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 4-18 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | - |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | Behavioral Research in Accounting |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 37 (No. 2) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 111–124. |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | Prior contract framing research finds that agents generally choose to provide greater effort under penalty contracts than under economically equivalent bonus contracts. At the same time, many individuals tend to be overconfident in their own abilities, which may alter agents’ expectancies when making effort provision decisions. In this study, we extend the contract framing literature by conducting an experiment in which participants can improve the likelihood of earning a bonus or avoiding a penalty by providing greater costly effort and by performing well on the experimental task. We find that participants who are not overconfident in their ability to perform the task well exhibit the general contract framing effect, whereas overconfident participants do not. This suggests that for work tasks where production is a function of both effort and ability, the preponderance of overconfident individuals consistent with the “better-than-average effect” mutes the effect of contract framing on effort. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | Behavioral Research in Accounting |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 37 (No. 2) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 93–110 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | Prior research shows that individuals benefit from abstract construals when performing broader high-level assurance tasks. We extend this research by studying the effects of different construal mindsets on skepticism and performance in a low-level assurance task setting. Using a sample of 195 online participants, we find that individuals benefit from concrete (versus abstract) mindsets when performing low-level assurance tasks because concrete construals better allow them to focus on detailed evidence that may contradict client assertions. Specifically, we show that assurance providers who utilize a concrete (abstract) construal mindset when performing a low-level task display better (worse) skeptical judgments and actions. Taken together with findings from past research, our results support the notion that assurance providers should utilize the construal mindset that best matches the characteristics of the task at hand. Exploratory analysis suggests that client retention incentives may moderate the relationship between skeptical judgment and skeptical action in our context. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | Behavioral Research in Accounting |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 37 (No. 2) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 69–91. |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | Two aspects of critical audit matter (CAM) disclosure are (1) whether it relates to complexity in audit judgments (complex CAM) or uncertainty in underlying management estimates (uncertain CAM) and (2) whether an indication of the outcome of audit procedures performed to address the CAM is included in the disclosure. We use two controlled experiments to examine the joint effects of CAM nature and the presence of a CAM outcome indication on investors’ judgments of investment attractiveness. In the first (second) experiment, we used a stronger (weaker) outcome indication, which provides stronger (weaker) conclusions about the audit procedures performed to address the CAM. We find that the provision of a stronger (weaker) outcome indication increases investment attractiveness judgments to a greater (an equal) extent for an uncertain CAM than for a complex CAM. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | Behavioral Research in Accounting |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 37 (No. 2) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 53–68 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | The dynamics of the auditor-client interaction can provide cues and information that may affect audit quality beyond the collection of evidence. However, more research is needed to understand how certain cues from these interactions might factor into auditor decisions. Using the Elaboration Likelihood Model as a theoretical framework, we provide insight into how auditors use client management team likeability in their audit judgments. Our results suggest that audit committee strength influences auditor elaboration, thereby shifting how auditors use likeability as an information cue. We find that, when there is a weak (strong) audit committee, auditors use less (more) elaboration, which causes their inventory write-down judgments to be more (less) influenced by unlikeable client management teams. Moderated mediation analyses support the Elaboration Likelihood Model, providing a starting point for future research to examine other auditing judgments that could be affected by this theory. |
| Nama Pengarang | : | - |
| Nama Majalah/Jurnal | : | Behavioral Research in Accounting |
| Volume / Nomor Edisi | : | 37 (No. 2) |
| Nomor Halaman | : | 27–51 |
| Abstraksi Narasi | : | The literature shows that organizations may use control mechanisms in both coercive and enabling ways to manage efficiency and flexibility. However, the predominant view assumes that the use of coercive control negatively affects employees. Thus, this study aims to provide empirical evidence regarding how employees respond to the use of coercive control. We draw on social exchange theory to hypothesize that the use of coercive control will manifest in higher turnover intentions and lower employee performance as employees engage in organizational cynicism. Using survey data from 899 employees, we find evidence consistent with our hypotheses. Practically, our results suggest that firms should carefully consider whether the use of coercive control is worth the cost of increased employee cynicism. Supplemental analysis reveals that decentralization and participation in control system design are two mechanisms that firms can use to mitigate the effects of cynicism associated with the use of coercive control. |